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Against several recent interpretations, I argue in this paper that Immanuel Kant’s support for enlightened abso-
lutism was a permanent feature of his political thought that fit comfortably within his larger philosophy, though he
saw such rule as part of a transition to democratic self-government initiated by the absolute monarch himself. I
support these contentions with (1) a detailed exegesis of Kant’s essay “What is Enlightenment?” (2) an argument
that Kantian republicanism requires not merely a separation of powers but also a representative democratic legis-
lature, and (3) a demonstration that each stage of a democratic transition can potentially be in an absolute
monarch’s short-run self-interest. I conclude the paper by defending Kant’s theory of democratization against charges
of consequentialism and paternalism and by pointing out its similarity to other accounts of democratic transitions
(for example, those of Samuel Huntington and Guillermo O’Donnell), suggesting a previously unnoticed opportu-
nity for cross-fertilization between political philosophy and comparative politics.
liberal mode, has focused almost entirely on the elab-
oration and systematization of principles of justice,
paying little if any attention to the question of imple-
mentation: how should we go about making real-
world practices and institutions, imperfect as they
clearly are, consistent with right? More specifically,
short shrift has been given to ascertaining the claims
of justice in the face of partial compliance (e.g., exist-
ing injustices, including systematic ones) and unfa-
vorable conditions (e.g., extreme poverty or an
authoritarian political culture), or to what has come
to be called “nonideal theory” (Rawls 1999b, 215–16).3
Even John Rawls’ political thought, which is unusually
sensitive to the distinction between ideal and nonideal
theory (1999b, 132, 214–20, 476), focuses nearly
exclusively on the former, even in its later, more “polit-
ical” incarnation.4
What makes this silence all the more remarkable
are the frequent discussions of nonideal theory and
particularly democratic transitions throughout the
history of liberal political thought. John Stuart Mill
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ver the past three decades, we have witnessed
an unprecedented transformation of the
world’s political landscape. Authoritarian
governments throughout Latin America, Africa, East
Asia, and the former Soviet Bloc have been replaced
by democratic ones. In fact, the percentage of coun-
tries having democratic governments rose from a
mere 27.3% in 1974 to 62.7% in 2002, according to
Freedom House scoring (Diamond 2003, 3). This
“third wave” of democratization, though it has slowed
in recent years, shows no signs yet of reversing (Hunt-
ington 1991).
Scholars in comparative politics have written
extensively on the causes and consequences of these
democratic transitions.1 By contrast, the political-
theory community has had surprisingly little to say
about this subject.2 Isaac (1995) has spoken quite elo-
quently of the deafening silence of political theory
regarding the anticommunist revolutions of 1989, but
the problem is much more general than this. Con-
temporary political theory, particularly in its analytic-
1Contributors to this literature include Diamond (1999), Huntington (1991), Przeworski et al. (2000), and Zakaria (2003).
2See, however, the recent work of Dunn (2004).
3Two noteworthy exceptions to this claim are Cohen (2000) and Murphy (2003).
4The distinction plays a more central role in The Law of Peoples (Rawls 1999a), but the part dealing with nonideal theory spends little
time on the question of transitions to “well-ordered societies,” though the three guidelines for the duty of assistance discussed there do
offer the beginnings of an answer (§15).
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(1991), for example, infamously argued that at times
a people is unfit to govern itself due to character flaws
that can only be remedied by an accumulation of
needed democratic virtues under an enlightened
despot, whether domestic or foreign, after which 
collective self-rule becomes possible. Alexis de 
Tocqueville (2003) similarly explored the conditions
under which democratic governments can be created
and sustained in his celebrated Democracy in America.5
Someone familiar with Immanuel Kant largely
through the writings of neo-Kantians such as Rawls
might reasonably believe that, in contrast to Mill and
Tocqueville, Kant wrote little on this topic, but such
an inference would be mistaken: Kant wrote exten-
sively on democratization in his essays on history 
and politics. Somewhat like Mill, Kant believed that
the transition to a representative democracy will take
place under the enlightened rule of an absolute
monarch, one who will lead his people from a state of
minority (i.e., the inability to think for oneself
without the guidance of another) to full intellectual
and political self-government. Such a monarch will
discharge this task by maintaining public order, pro-
tecting civil liberties such as freedom of the press, pro-
moting (or at least not hampering) public education,
and gradually ceding legislative power to representa-
tive institutions on matters of war, taxation, etc.
Finally, he will be motivated to do these things—
which are wholly contrary to his long-run interests—
by the exigencies of geopolitical competition: to
strengthen his society for such competition and secure
the financing that he needs for military campaigns, he
will gradually have to enlighten and empower his own
people. Though each step in this process will be in the
short-run interest of the monarch, it will lead to his
political disempowerment in the long run, turning
him into a limited, constitutional monarch con-
strained by a democratic legislature.
As this synopsis suggests, Kant presented a
remarkably nuanced theoretical account of how a
democratic transition might take place, the richness of
which has not been appreciated by previous inter-
preters. My paper, by detailing this account, will
provide a compelling example of nonideal theorizing
that is sadly missing from Rawls’ neo-Kantian theory
and contemporary political theory more generally, but
need not be.
My reading of Kant’s nonideal political theory is,
for a number of reasons, controversial. The idea that
a great German liberal like Kant would defend abso-
lutism has discomfited many of his scholarly inter-
preters, who have responded in diverse ways.6 Some,
such as Cavallar, see this defense as but a temporary
aberration (“a short-lived love-affair . . . in the
1780’s”) from an otherwise consistent record of hos-
tility towards “Enlightened Absolutism” (1993, 105).
Other scholars, like Beiser, take the contrary position
that “Kant betrayed the radical insights behind his cri-
tique of reason and compromised with the status quo”
over his entire career (1992, 53). Even Kant’s more
sympathetic interpreters, such as Cronin (2003, 53)
and Williams (1983, 137), regard his political ideals 
as at least in part the result of an unprincipled 
accommodation with late eighteenth-century Pruss-
ian political reality. Other elements of my reading are
also controversial: Cronin (2003, 70–71) and others
have denied that Kant’s lifelong commitment 
to republicanism implies support for democratic
institutions, and Rosen (1993, 127) has questioned 
the idea that monarchical self-interest can motivate
the individual steps necessary to effect a democratic
transition.
Against these interpretations, I will argue in this
paper that Kant’s support for enlightened absolutism
was a continual feature of his political thought and
fully consistent with the rest of his practical philoso-
phy. At the same time, though, I will show that Kant
believed such rule should be merely transitional, a way
station on the route to the only kind of government
consistent with right, viz a republic, by which Kant
meant a representative democracy with separation 
of powers. A careful reading of his essay “What is
Enlightenment?” within the context of his other writ-
ings indicates that while his support for enlightened
absolutism was sincere, he believed that such rule 
was enlightened only insofar as it was ultimately 
self-extinguishing, a process made possible by the
myopic self-interest of the monarch. Much like
Laursen (1996), I discover subversive undercurrents
beneath the relatively placid surface of this essay, but
whereas Laursen finds them in Kant’s vocabulary of
“public” (Publikum) and “publicity” (Publicität), I find
them in Kant’s description of enlightened absolutism
itself.
Exposing these undercurrents will require a
careful reading of not only the enlightenment essay
but also Kant’s other writings. As we shall later see,
arguments made in this essay recur in his later writ-
5His writings on liberal empire, which are less coherent than those
of Mill, are explored by Pitts (2000) and Welch (2003).
6Beiser (1992, 15–18), in his magisterial study of early-modern
German political thought, categorizes Kant together with Schiller,
Humboldt, Jacobi, and Forster as liberals: each of them was a sup-
porter of personal liberty, a nonpaternalistic state, and individual
self-realization.
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ings but in a more complete form; consequently, they
shed light on the meaning of the earlier versions. This
inference might seem unwarranted—Kant may have
meant something entirely different by his earlier argu-
ments, as his political beliefs and assumptions surely
evolved over time as he matured as a thinker—but evi-
dence from Kant’s Reflexionen from the 1770s and his
lectures on natural law from the winter semester of
1784 (which is contemporaneous with the publication
of the enlightenment essay) indicate that Kant’s
mature political theory was basically in place by this
time (Beiser 1992, 32–33; Cronin 2003, 53–54n). The
Rechtslehre’s late release (in 1797) was a consequence
of Kant’s other intellectual commitments taking pri-
ority; the resulting work, long in the making, is almost
entirely a “compilation of old lecture notes” (Kuehn
2001, 393–94, 396). Therefore, we can reasonably
assume that Kant’s political thought changed little
between the early 1780s and late 1790s and that all his
writings in this period reflect (more or less clearly and
completely) the same underlying political theory.
I will proceed as follows. In the first section of my
paper, I will offer a detailed exegesis of the enlighten-
ment essay. This exegesis will raise two important
questions. First, to what form of self-government are
men being led, i.e., what is the nature of Kantian
republicanism? Second, what would motivate an
absolute monarch to undermine his own rule in this
way? I will address these questions in the second and
third sections of the paper, respectively. Finally, I will
respond in the fourth section to two potential objec-
tions: namely, that interpreting Kant as a defender of
enlightened absolutism turns him into either a conse-
quentialist or a paternalist.
An Exegesis of “What is
Enlightenment?”
Kant begins his essay by defining “enlightenment”
(Aufklärung) as “the human being’s emergence from
his self-incurred minority,” where “minority”
(Unmündigkeit) is defined as an “inability to make use
of one’s own understanding without direction from
another” (WIE 8:35).7 Though our own “laziness” and
“cowardice” are the primary reasons for our minority,
those who guide us (priests, doctors, officers, tax-offi-
cials) have an interest in maintaining and reinforcing
it. How, then, are we to surmount such obstacles and
achieve enlightenment? Kant discusses three possible
paths to enlightenment, although two of them turn
out to be false ones. The first path requires each indi-
vidual to overcome immaturity through his own
effort, but Kant argues that the “precepts and formu-
las” (Satzungen und Formeln) that weigh us down are
too heavy to be removed by individual initiative
alone—except for a talented few who succeed “by their
own cultivation of their spirit in extricating them-
selves from minority.” The second path is through
violent revolution against our guardians, but Kant
believes that such a short cut to enlightenment will
never produce “a true reform in one’s way of thinking;
instead, new prejudices will serve just as well as the old
ones to harness the great unthinking masses” (8:36).8
After warning against these two false paths to
enlightenment, Kant points to a third path. Unlike the
first path, which counsels individualism, it recognizes
that it “is more possible . . . that a public should
enlighten itself” collectively; unlike the second path,
which promises a quick fix, it realizes that “a public
can achieve enlightenment only slowly.” To identify
this path, Kant says, we must determine “what sort of
restriction hinders enlightenment, and what sort does
not hinder it but instead promotes it.” Contrary to the
customary liberal prescription, Kant suggests that the
“public use of one’s reason” must be perfectly free,
while the “private use of one’s reason” may reasonably
be subject to control—indeed, must be subject to
control in order for the public use of reason to flour-
ish and for enlightenment to be achieved, as we shall
see (8:36–7).
But what does Kant mean by these terms? The
private use of reason is that use of reason that we make
7References to Kant will consist of (1) abbreviations for the works
from which they were drawn (unless it is obvious in context) and
(2) the relevant volume and page references to the standard criti-
cal edition of Kant (1900–). The only exception made to this
system will be for references to the Critique of Pure Reason (1998a),
where the supplemental references will be to pages in the first
(1781 or “A”) and second (1787 or “B”) editions of the work. What
follows is a complete list of the abbreviations I will use, in alpha-
betical order by abbreviation, including the English translation
used for each text: CF = Contest of the Faculties (Kant 1970,
176–90); CPrR = Critique of Practical Reason (1996, 133–272);
GMM = Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals (1996, 37–108);
IUH = “Idea for a universal history with a cosmopolitan purpose”
(1970, 41–53); MM = Metaphysics of Morals (consisting of the
Rechtslehre [Doctrine of Right] and the Tugendlehre [Doctrine of
Virtue]) (1996, 353–604); PP = “Toward perpetual peace” (1996,
311–52); Rel = Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason
(1998b, 31–192); T&P = “On the common saying: That may be
correct in theory, but it is of no use in practice” (1996, 273–310);
WIE = “An answer to the question: What is enlightenment?” (1996,
11–22); and WOT = “What does it mean to orient oneself in think-
ing?” (1998b, 1–14).
8I will return to Kant’s hostility to political revolution below; it is
a consistent feature of his practical philosophy. See, for example,
T&P 8:297–305, MM 6:318–23, and Rel 6:122.
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in our capacity as members of social hierarchies; it is
empirical practical reason (specifically, precepts of
skill) for the achievement of ends given to us by our
superiors (GMM 4:415).9 Thus, soldiers cannot
“engage openly in subtle reasoning about [the] appro-
priateness or utility” of the orders they receive, but
must simply obey them; citizens must not argue with
the tax collector over their tax bills, but must quietly
discharge their obligations; and priests cannot attack
church doctrine in the midst of communion, but must
carry out their duties as required by their offices (WIE
8:37–8). Such obedience is required to maintain social
order and to achieve important public ends, so our
superiors in these hierarchies are justified in punish-
ing us when we refuse to exercise our martial, ecclesi-
astical, or other skills for communal purposes.
The public use of reason, on the other hand, is that
use of reason that we make in our capacity as members
of learned society; the highest form of such reason is
pure reason, whether theoretical or practical, which
examines the foundations of science and mathematics,
politics and religion. Kant says that each person may
consider himself a “member of a whole common-
wealth, even of the society of citizens of the world” who
“in his capacity [as] a scholar . . . by his writings
addresses a public in the proper sense of the word”
(8:37). As literate individuals, we can step outside our
roles as members of social organizations and partici-
pate in learned society, where we are free to discuss and
to criticize. Thus, for example, while a soldier is not
allowed to “engage openly in subtle reasoning” about
his orders, he may offer his thoughts to the public
regarding military matters on his own time, in print.
Kant repeatedly emphasizes that what is needed
for the public use of reason to flourish and for enlight-
enment to be achieved is, first and foremost, intellec-
tual freedom. Public reason’s very existence depends
on free and open inquiry, as Kant argues in The 
Critique of Pure Reason:
Reason must subject itself to critique in all its undertak-
ings, and cannot restrict the freedom of critique through
any prohibition without damaging itself and drawing
upon itself a disadvantageous suspicion. . . . The very
existence of reason depends upon this freedom, which
has no dictatorial authority, but whose claim is never
anything more than the agreement of free citizens,
each of whom must be able to express his reservations,
indeed even his veto, without holding back.
(A738–39/B766–67)10
As this passage suggests, freedom of thought requires
freedom of the press, without which the former would
be endangered; as Kant asks elsewhere, “how much
and how correctly would we think if we did not think
as it were in community with others to whom we com-
municate our thoughts, and who communicate theirs
to us!” (WOT 8:144).
The second necessity is education. In both this
work and “Idea for a Universal History,” Kant treats
education as something that a public creates for itself,
“if only it is left its freedom” (WIE 8:36). As he puts it
in the latter essay, while “the world’s present rulers
have no money to spare for public educational insti-
tutions or indeed for anything which concerns the
world’s best interests (for everything has already been
calculated out in advance for the next war), they will
nonetheless find that it is to their own advantage . . .
not to hinder their citizens’ private efforts in this
direction, however weak and slow they may be” (IUH
8:28).11 However, in The Contest of the Faculties, pub-
lished 15 years later, Kant suggests a much more pos-
itive educational role for political rulers. He says there
that “the education of young people in intellectual and
moral culture” cannot hope to succeed “unless it is
designed on the considered plan and intention of the
highest authority in the state, then set in motion and
constantly maintained in uniform operation there-
after.” Kant admits, however, that such administration
can be expected from political rulers “only . . .
through their negative wisdom in furthering their
own ends,” a theme to which I will return below (CF
7:92–93).12
Intellectual freedom and education are necessary
but not sufficient for enlightenment; in addition, Kant
argues, civil unfreedom is required, a finding he admits
is “paradoxical.” By civil unfreedom, he appears to
mean the restrictions on the private use of reason pre-
viously discussed along with the political means to
enforce them—specifically, a “well-disciplined and
numerous army ready to guarantee public peace” as
9Cf. Cronin (2003, 56–57) and Schmidt (1989, 288), who see
private reason as being reason valid for the realm of contractual
relations.
10On the relationship between public reason and free inquiry, see
O’Neill (1989, 28–50).
11Kant may have in mind here Frederick the Great’s ill-funded
1763 attempt to create a universal primary education system in
Prussia.
12It has been suggested that The Contest of the Faculties is more
hostile to absolutism than earlier works, which if true might call
into question my claim in the introduction that Kant’s political
theory changed hardly at all between the early 1780s and late
1790s. Kant is certainly more openly critical of unenlightened
absolutism in this work than in previous ones (e.g., 7:80).
However, the work is in other respects entirely consistent with his
earlier political writings, especially regarding the impermissibility
of revolution, the necessity of top-down reform by an enlightened
ruler, and the desirability of mass education and enlightenment
(7:86n, 87–88, 89–91, 92–93).
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well as an enlightened absolute monarch to govern
(WIE 8:41). Kant is not clear about why civil freedom
would set up “insurmountable barriers” to intellectual
freedom and therefore enlightenment, but his reasons
are not difficult to discern. The intellectual freedom
that Kant endorses is a wide-ranging one, embracing
art, science, religion, and even legislation, but the crit-
ical public culture that this freedom makes possible is
by its very nature subversive, leading its participants
to question and criticize the “precepts and formulas”
that buttress the authority of doctors, priests, and offi-
cers of the law. Without an enlightened absolute
monarch at the head of a “well-disciplined and
numerous army,” such criticism might threaten the
very public order that facilitates the long and labori-
ous exploration of ideas needed for enlightenment; it
might even provoke a popular uprising that would
harness an insufficiently enlightened public with “new
prejudices” as pernicious as the old ones they replaced
(8:36).
A republic, by contrast, would be incapable of
providing this kind of external discipline. Its natural
responsiveness to the preferences and passions of its
semi-enlightened citizenry would lead it to censor
ideas that its citizens found threatening or offensive
and to respond inadequately to outbreaks of lawless-
ness. This is why Kant argues that an enlightened
absolute monarch “can say what a free state may not
dare to say: Argue as much as you will and about what
you will; only obey!” (8:41) Just as our interlocutors in
learned society provide a guidance that differs in kind
from that offered by our guardians, so the enlightened
monarch imposes a constraint that differs in kind
from that imposed by unenlightened rulers, who offer
nothing but “personal despotism and . . . avaricious
or tyrannical oppression” (8:36).
As I just indicated, however, a tension exists
between argument and obedience, a tension that
motivates Kant to endorse enlightened absolutism but
that promises to greaten with time. As a people grow
increasingly enlightened, their hostility to established
authority and its ideological supports will grow as
well: the “precepts and formulas” formerly offered by
their guardians will seem increasingly hollow and
inadequate, and they will begin to question the legit-
imacy of rule that is not subject to the same mature
public reason that governs the world of ideas. Kant
indeed recognizes this dialectical tension and hints at
a resolution in the last sentences of his essay:
A greater degree of civil freedom seems advantageous to
a people’s freedom of spirit and nevertheless puts up
insurmountable barriers to it; a lesser degree of the
former, on the other hand, provides a space for the latter
to expand to its full capacity. Thus when nature has
unwrapped, from under this hard shell [harten Hülle],
the seed [Keim] for which she cares most tenderly,
namely the propensity and calling to think freely, the
latter gradually works back upon the mentality of the
people (which thereby gradually becomes capable of
freedom in acting) and eventually even upon the princi-
ples of government, which finds it profitable to itself to
treat the human being, who is now more than a machine,
in keeping with his dignity. (8:41–42)
This rich, somewhat obscure passage needs to be care-
fully unwrapped itself; I believe it holds the key to
Kant’s theory of enlightened absolutism. Attend first
to the botanical imagery. Kant describes civil unfree-
dom (i.e., enlightened but militarily powerful absolute
monarchy limiting the private use of reason) as a
“hard shell” that safeguards our “propensity and
calling to think freely,” which he describes as a “seed”
in need of development. This shell, hard but capa-
cious, “provides a space” for the seed to grow and
mature; this space is intellectual freedom, and the
maturation of the seed is the steady process of enlight-
enment that culminates in our intellectual majority.
A germinating seed soon presses against its shell,
however, and the pressure gradually builds; this pres-
sure is symbolic of the tension between argument and
obedience that I discussed above. This tension is
resolved when the seed is “unwrapped” by “nature”:
the shell, weakened by time and weather, is slowly
penetrated and disintegrated by the germinating seed,
which no longer needs its protection. The metaphor
is most complex—and subversive—at precisely this
point. If the shell is indeed civil unfreedom, then 
its penetration and disintegration suggests that an
enlightened people attains not merely freedom in
thinking but also “freedom in acting,” i.e., it assumes
responsibility for its own governance. Intellectual self-
government, which is facilitated by a critical public
culture flourishing under the protection of an enlight-
ened absolute monarch, becomes a prelude to and
preparation for political self-government. Nature
(which is itself used as a metaphor for providence
[Vorsehung] in Kant’s other writings, notably “Perpet-
ual Peace” [8:360–63]) makes this transition possible,
but the details are difficult to infer from the metaphor
itself: a shell may passively submit to disintegration 
by a germinating seed, but why would an absolute
monarch allow himself to be displaced by his enlight-
ened subjects, who are now able to govern themselves?
In fact, why would he ever allow, much less encour-
age, his own subjects to grow into such a threat to
begin with? Kant suggests in the above passage that a
government may find the adoption of political prin-
ciples more consistent with human dignity “profitable
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to itself”; in other words, self-interest may motivate an
absolute monarch’s early support for enlightenment
and his eventual acquiescence in representative insti-
tutions, a possibility to which I will return below.
Additional support for my reading of this botan-
ical imagery is provided by Kant himself in a strikingly
similar passage in his 1793 book Religion within the
Boundaries of Mere Reason, in which he uses gestation
imagery to describe “the continuous development of
the pure religion of reason [reinen Vernuftreligion] out
of its present still indispensable shell [Hülle]” of his-
torical faith:
The integuments [Hüllen] within which the embryo is
first formed into a human being must be laid aside if
the latter is to see the light of day. The leading-string of
holy tradition, with its appendages, its statutes and
observances, which in its time did good service, become
bit by bit dispensable, yea, finally, when a human being
enters upon his adolescence, turn into a fetter. (Rel 6:121,
135)
Historical faiths, which divide men from one another
with their different holy texts and statutes, can only
lay claim to being true faiths by serving as a “vehicle”
for the pure religion of reason, which is a moral reli-
gion, i.e., a religion of “good life-conduct,” not of
ritual observance (6:123, 170–1). This moral religion
will gradually displace the ecclesiastical elements of
the historical faiths, including not merely “statutes and
observances” but even religious hierarchy itself: “the
degrading distinction between laity and clergy ceases,
and equality springs from true freedom, yet without
anarchy, for each obeys the law (not the statutory one)
which he has prescribed for himself . . .” (6:122). This
vision of co-legislation of the moral law by a priest-
hood of all believers has subversive implications for
religion and politics.
Let us return to the last sentences of the enlight-
enment essay excerpted above. Attend now to the
mechanistic imagery at the close of the passage. Hans
Reiss suggests that this is an allusion to Julien Offray
de la Mettrie’s materialistic doctrine in L’Homme
Machine (Kant 1970, 274n7).13 It may also though be
a reference to another use of mechanistic imagery in
the essay, which is in the midst of Kant’s discussion of
the private use of reason. He says there that a social
hierarchy serving public ends (e.g., the military, the
church, etc.) is like a “mechanism” and that when an
individual serves in such a hierarchy he acts as “part
of the machine” (WIE 8:37). Therefore, to say that
man is “now more than a machine” is to say that an
enlightened man is capable of service in institutions
other than social hierarchies and is capable of reason
beyond the limited, functional private reason proper
to such hierarchies, which is exemplified by “precepts
and formulas, those mechanical instruments of a
rational use, or rather misuse, of his natural endow-
ments” (8:36). In other words, man’s capacity for a
public use of reason marks him out as a potential par-
ticipant not only in the cosmopolitan society of men
of letters but also in the critical political culture of a
self-governing people. To deny this potential, as Kant
in his work “Perpetual Peace” accuses the cynical
“political moralist” of doing, involves “throwing
human beings into one class with other living
machines” (PP 8:378). To affirm it, on the other hand,
is to acknowledge man’s aptitude for an active, repub-
lican citizenship, which is the ultimate way in which
enlightenment “eventually even [works back] upon
the principles of government.”
Kantian Republicanism
What is the nature of the republicanism Kant gestures
toward in the concluding sentences of his enlighten-
ment essay? I suggested in the introduction that
Kantian republicanism requires a representative
democracy with separation of powers, but this claim
is not uncontroversial. Cronin (2003, 70–71) and Ker-
sting (1993, 25–28), for example, argue that a separa-
tion of powers between the legislative and executive
branches is sufficient for Kantian republicanism.14
This reading of Kant is a reasonable one, as the rele-
vant passages can be interpreted in a variety of ways,
yet I will argue that a separation of powers is neces-
sary but not sufficient for Kantian republicanism by
offering a different reading of these passages and
others. I will then argue that a Kantian republic must
have a representative legislature chosen by a restricted
electorate of “active” citizens, a point that Kant makes
throughout his political writings but most clearly in
the Rechtslehre. I will also show that the resulting
mixed constitution, while plausibly characterized as 
a democratic one, differs in important ways from 
our own mass democracies, especially with respect to
13Even nonmaterialistic doctrines can turn man into a machine,
however, as Kant indicates in the second Critique when he com-
pares Leibnizian freedom to that of a “turnspit [Bratenwender]”
(CPrR 5:97).
14Kersting has argued elsewhere, though, that Kantian republican-
ism does require representative democracy: see Kersting (1992a,
152, 161; 1992b, 361). Moreover, the cited passage from Wohlge-
ordnete Freiheit (1993) shows that this sufficiency condition does
little to guarantee conformity between resulting legislation and the
general will.
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the nature of the executive and the extent of the 
franchise.15
Cronin and Kersting ground their argument on a
distinction Kant makes in “Perpetual Peace” between
two ways of categorizing states: the first is “according
to the different persons who have supreme power
within a state,” which Kant labels the “form of sover-
eignty” (Form der Beherrschung, also translatable as
“form of mastery or control”); the second is “accord-
ing to the way a people is governed by its head of state,
whoever this may be,” which Kant calls the “form 
of government” (Form der Regierung).16 Sovereignty
(thus defined) can take three subforms: autocracy,
aristocracy, and democracy (the power of prince, nobil-
ity, and people, respectively); government, on the
other hand, can take two subforms: republicanism
(“the separation of the executive power (the govern-
ment) from the legislative power”) and despotism
(“the high-handed management of the state by laws
that the regent has himself given”) (PP 8:352).17 The
separation of powers is clearly a necessary condition
for republicanism here, perhaps even the primary one.
The stronger claim that it is a sufficient condition
hinges on the relative indifference Kant shows to the
form of sovereignty—except for democracy as it was
practiced by the “ancient republics” (such as Athens),
which Kant considers necessarily despotic because 
it combines executive and legislative functions in a
single assembly of all citizens (8:351–53, 378). If we
set aside this one exception, though, Kant does seem
to believe that any form of sovereignty can in princi-
ple be consistent with republican government. If this
is so, then how can it be true (as I claim) that a Kantian
republic requires representative democracy?
We should note that Kant denotes sovereignty
here with assorted German words/phrases (“supreme
power” [oberste Staatsgewalt], “sovereignty”
[Beherrschung], “sovereign power” [Herrschergewalt],
etc.), none of which indicate whether he is speaking
of the executive power, the legislative power, or both.
Moreover, the entire discussion following the original
taxonomy of forms of state is about who should have
executive power (ausführenden/exekutive Gewalt), i.e.,
control the government (Regierung). This strongly
suggests that the distinction between the form of sov-
ereignty and the form of government is in reality a dis-
tinction between who controls the executive and how
the executive exercises its authority. This interpreta-
tion receives support from both within the essay and
outside it. First, in the paragraph immediately pre-
ceding the one containing the forms of state, Kant says
that “the consent of the citizens of a [republican] state
is required in order to decide whether there shall be
war or not (and it cannot be otherwise in this constitu-
tion)” (8:350; emphasis added). What kind of consent
is he picturing? In the Rechtslehre he puts it more pre-
cisely: republican citizens “must therefore give their
free assent, through their representatives, not only to
waging war in general but also to each particular dec-
laration of war” (MM 6:345–46). Kant is indicating
here that republicanism requires a representative dem-
ocratic legislature to approve military action inter alia.
Consequently, Kant’s relative indifference to the form
of sovereignty is an indifference to the form of the
executive, not of the legislature. Second, nowhere in
the discussion of forms of state in “Perpetual Peace”
does Kant use the German word Souverän (“sover-
eign”), which he later uses as a technical term for a
sovereign legislature in the Rechtslehre; he therefore
leaves unspecified the identity of the “supreme power”
(MM 6:313).18 Finally, Kant says in the Rechtslehre,
during a discussion of the executive, that “a govern-
ment [Regierung] that was also legislative would have
to be called despotic” (6:316). Once again, this sen-
tence emphasizes that despotism and republicanism
are attributes of the executive: does the executive,
regardless of who controls it, arrogate to itself legisla-
tive authority? In summary, what Kant is saying in this
passage of “Perpetual Peace” is that any variety of exec-
utive (apart from an Athenian-style assembly) can in
principle be consistent with republicanism; this leaves
open the question of whether the same can be said for
the form of the legislature.19
15Other scholars have also argued that Kantian republicanism
involves these two criteria (representative democracy and separa-
tion of powers), including Cavallar (1993, 120), Williams (1983,
216; 2003, Chapter 6), and Rosen (1993, 33–39). With the partial
exception of Williams, however, these authors do not make their
case with a detailed textual analysis of Kant’s political writings; I
will do so in this section.
16This distinction (suitably generalized) has long been a staple of
Western political thought: see, for example, Aristotle (1984, 94–96
[1278b–1279b]).
17Cf. Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1997, 67n, 82–99 [Book II, Chapter
6; Book III, Chapters 1–6]).
18Gregor points out in a footnote here, though, that Kant is not
very consistent in his use of Souverän and introduces “such a
variety of terms that it is not always clear which of the three
authorities [i.e., the executive, legislature, or judiciary] is under
discussion” (Kant 1996, 457).
19A skeptical reader might point to §51 of the Rechtslehre to prove
otherwise, as it appears to be parallel in structure to the passage
in “Perpetual Peace” and is quite explicitly about the legislative
sovereign (Souverän), but it in fact reinforces my interpretation.
First, Kant makes a key distinction in §51 that he does not make
in “Perpetual Peace” between an autocrat and a monarch (the
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As the above passage on war approval indicates,
however, Kant is hardly indifferent to the form of the
legislature: he supports a representative democratic
legislature with power over war, taxation, and even the
executive branch itself, however it is constituted—or
so I will argue. Kant lays out his views regarding the
legislative branch most clearly in the Rechtslehre. He
says there that “sovereignty” (Souveränität) resides in
the “person of the legislator” and moreover that “leg-
islative authority can belong only to the united will of
the people” (6:313). The “active” citizens of a republic
are described as those with an “equal right to vote
within this constitution” and “the right to manage 
the state itself . . . [to] organize it or to cooperate for
introducing certain laws” (6:314–15). Does this mean
that Kant, like Rousseau, was an advocate of direct
democracy? Not at all. Kant goes on say that citizens
are “represented by [their] deputies (in parliament)”
and “act through their delegates (deputies),” i.e., their
political agency is expressed by voting for and other-
wise trying to influence their legislative representa-
tives (6:319, 341). As noted above, the legislature can
grant or withhold war-making powers from the exec-
utive; it also has power of the purse: “the people taxes
itself, since the only way of proceeding in accordance
with principles of right in this matter is for taxes to 
be levied by those deputized by the people” (6:325).
Finally, and most radically (given his political
context), Kant gives the legislature the right to “take
the ruler’s [executive’s] authority away from him,
depose him, or reform his administration. But it
cannot punish him (and the saying common in
England, that the king, i.e., the supreme executive
authority, can do no wrong, means no more than
this)” (6:317; cf. Riley [1983, 106–107]). Given his
experience with the Prussian censors, such an asser-
tion may strike the reader as quite bold, bordering on
reckless, but Kant does rule out punishment of the
monarch (no doubt with Louis XVI in mind), and he
later stresses that the people can only “legally resist the
executive authority and its representatives (the minis-
ter) by means of its representatives (in parliament)”
(6:322).20 Kant’s motto, as always, is reform not 
revolution.21
The mixed republican constitution that Kant
envisions can reasonably be characterized as a repre-
sentative democracy, but two caveats are required.
First, as noted above, Kant leaves open the nature of
the executive, but he expresses a clear preference for
monarchy, as a king is in a better position to plan and
institute the reforms required to bring a constitution
into conformity with republican principles—a posi-
tion we might have expected Kant to take, given his
support for enlightened absolutism (PP 8:353).22 Cen-
tralized administration might also be advantageous in
establishing clear lines of authority and responsibility
for the execution of laws; the dangers that are com-
monly associated with such a concentration of
authority would be counterbalanced by the legisla-
ture’s power to depose, reform, or otherwise constrain
the executive. This being said, Kant offers no reason
former is the sovereign legislator, while the latter merely represents
him); this difference between the two texts is explained (on my
interpretation) by the fact that Kant was simply not talking about
the legislator in the latter, which made the distinction superfluous.
Second, Kant comes to an entirely different conclusion in §51 
than in “Perpetual Peace” about which form of sovereignty is 
most conducive to despotism: in the former, it is autocracy,
whereas in the latter, it is democracy. Again, this difference can be
readily explained by the fact that Kant is talking about the legisla-
tor in the former text and the executive in the latter one. See MM
6:338–39.
20On censorship of religious and political writings under Freder-
ick the Great and his immediate successor, Frederick William II,
see Cavallar (1993, 112–14, 117–18) as well as Beiser (1992,
48–53). Kant’s relationship with Frederick the Great’s minister of
state and head of ecclesiastical affairs, the liberal K. A. F. von
Zedlitz, was extremely close, but he ran into problems with von
Zedlitz’s reactionary successor, J. C. Wöllner. Kant was censured
for his religious writings and threatened with “unpleasant meas-
ures for [his] continued obstinacy”; he consequently promised to
write no further on religious matters, a promise he kept until the
death of Frederick William II in 1797. For more details, see Kuehn
(2001, 378–82, 404).
21On Kant’s reformism, see Williams (2003, 183–88). Kant’s
support for representative democracy is occasionally called into
question by reference to his essay “Theory and Practice” (esp.
8:294–97). Kant says there that in a rightful constitution each
citizen is a “colegislator,” that laws are to be endorsed by “those
delegated to do so as representatives of the people,” etc.; in short,
he develops a representative democratic system that seems identi-
cal to the one developed in the Rechtslehre. In contrast to the latter
work, however, Kant goes on to say that “it is by no means neces-
sary” that this system “be presupposed as a fact. . . . It is instead
only an idea of reason. . . .” Is this treatment of representative
democracy as a merely hypothetical constraint on the will of the
legislator consistent with what Kant says in the Rechtslehre? Yes,
because Kant is speaking in “Theory and Practice” about citizens
(or rather their representatives) voting on the “basic law” or “orig-
inal contract,” not on regular legislation. This consent to the orig-
inal contract is indeed entirely hypothetical, though it does impose
moral constraints on the behavior of legislators and (more impor-
tantly for our purposes) does point the way toward a true repub-
lic, where the general will is made legislatively sovereign through
representative democracy: as Kant says a bit later in the essay, the
power of the people via their legislators to veto or approve war
(which I discussed above) “necessarily presupposes the realization
of that idea of the original contract” (8:311).
22Kant also notes that an absolute monarch is “stronger . . . in rela-
tion to external enemies” than other kinds of executive, i.e., abso-
lutism offers military advantages under dangerous international
conditions (PP 8:373).
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why, once a republic has been achieved, the monarchy
could not be made elective or even transformed into
a limited-term president, indirectly or perhaps
directly elected by the people.23
Second, Kant believes that the vote should be
limited to “active” (rather than “passive”) citizens. He
defines an active citizen as one who is “independent,”
i.e., capable of “acting from his own choice” and there-
fore not dependent “upon the will of others” (MM
6:314–15). By this definition he apparently intends 
to exclude from the franchise whoever is personally
dependent upon others for his “preservation in exis-
tence (his being fed and protected),” whether through
employment or familial dependency (e.g., wives and
children) (T&P 8:295–96).24 Although he does not
discuss his reasons for restricting the franchise in this
way, he seems to believe that passive citizens would 
be unduly influenced by those upon whom they are
dependent; allowing them to vote would therefore
undermine the integrity of republican governance by
effectively giving multiple votes to employers, hus-
bands, and fathers—though a secret ballot could
surely reduce this kind of influence.25 From our own
perspective, such restrictions on voting may seem
reactionary. In fairness, however, we should note that
Kant also says that the “natural laws of freedom and
. . . equality” require that “anyone can work his way up
from this passive condition to an active one,” i.e.,
anyone who can escape personal dependency (by
becoming an independent artisan, yeoman farmer,
etc.) is entitled to the franchise (MM 6:315).26 No
individuals are permanently excluded from the fran-
chise except women, an exception that is deeply puz-
zling on Kant’s own terms. Why, for example, would
an independently wealthy widow, free from all per-
sonal dependence (both economic and familial), not
have had a rightful claim to the franchise for the
reasons just given? The only answer seems to be the
prejudice against women that Kant unfortunately
shared with his contemporaries, one that has no basis
whatsoever in his critical philosophy.27
The Problem of Motivation
We have seen in the previous two sections that,
according to Kant, an absolute monarch is best placed
to lead his society to intellectual enlightenment and
republican government, i.e., a representative democ-
racy with a separation of powers. Given that absolute
monarchy is despotic by definition (though it might
govern in a republican spirit), the move to republican
government must involve the creation and gradual
empowerment of a popular legislative assembly, one
that will accumulate powers over taxation, war, and
even the monarch himself (cf. Williams [1983, 176,
217]). The monarch has a moral duty to facilitate this
transition to intellectual and political self-govern-
ment, as Kant says clearly in the Rechtslehre:
The spirit of the original contract (anima pacti origi-
narii) involves an obligation on the part of the consti-
tuting authority to make the kind of government suited
to the idea of the original contract. Accordingly, even if
this cannot be done all at once, it is under an obligation
to change the kind of government gradually and contin-
ually so that it harmonizes in its effect with the only con-
stitution that accords with right, that of a pure republic.
. . . Any true republic is and can only be a system repre-
senting the people, in order to protect its rights in its
name, by all the citizens united and acting through their
delegates (deputies). (6:340–41)28
Moreover, the monarch is authorized to guide this
transition by a lex permissiva: he may defer the insti-
tution of a government fully consistent with right
“until the people gradually becomes susceptible to the
influence of the mere idea of the authority of law . . .
and thus is found fit to legislate for itself”; such a delay
must be allowed “lest implementing [self-rule] pre-23On the possibility of an elected executive in Kant’s scheme, see
Williams (1983, 176).
24Kant includes civil servants among the active citizenry, despite
the fact that they are in an employment relationship with the state.
Rosen (1993, 38) finds this exception arbitrary, but employees of
an impersonal bureaucracy with civil-service protections might
not be “personally dependent” upon anyone. Of course, Prussian
civil servants in Kant’s time were personally dependent on an
absolute monarch, but such an exception might still be justifiable
in a Rechtsstaat.
25Rosen (1993, 38–39) concurs in this interpretation.
26This is consistent with Kant’s general hostility to any form of
hereditary privilege: “every member of a commonwealth must be
allowed to attain any level of rank within it (that can belong to a
subject) to which his talent, his industry and his luck can take him”
(T&P 8:292). On this point, see Kersting (1993, 381–83).
27In “Theory and Practice,” Kant says that the status of being a
woman or a child is a “natural” reason for denial of the franchise,
but he does not elaborate (8:295). His attitude toward women is
strangely conflicted: at times he can be comically hostile (as in his
portrayal of the sexually voracious woman in the appendix of the
Rechtslehre), but at other times he can be surprisingly egalitarian
in his attitude (as in his analysis of marriage in the Rechtslehre,
where he says that “the relation of partners in a marriage is a rela-
tion of equality of possession, equality in their possession of each
other as persons . . . and also equality in their possession of mate-
rial goods”). See MM 6:278, 359–60, as well as Herman (1993a).
28On the moral duty of a monarch to promote republicanism and
govern in its spirit, see Kersting (1993, 430).
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maturely counteract its very purpose,” as discussed
above (PP 8:347–48, 372–73).29
Even if absolute monarchs were uniquely situated,
authorized, and morally obligated to make this tran-
sition occur, however, what material incentive would
they have to do so?30 Why would they create an
enlightened populace (by allowing intellectual
freedom and perhaps even promoting public educa-
tion) that would seek to undermine their rule and
limit their power? As Kant suggests hopefully at the
end of his enlightenment essay and argues more
explicitly in his other writings, self-interest may moti-
vate an absolute monarch’s early support for enlight-
enment and eventual acquiescence in democratic
institutions. The demands of military and economic
competition with other states may compel monarchs
to adopt a sequence of policies over time that, while
individually sensible, jointly contribute to their own
political emasculation.31
Kant says in “Idea for a Universal History” that
“the mutual relationships between states are already so
sophisticated that none of them can neglect its inter-
nal culture without losing power and influence in 
relation to the others.” In other words, geopolitical
concerns cause state leaders to engage in internal
reform as a means of strengthening their societies for
various forms of international competition. Some of
these internal reforms are not directly related, at least,
to intellectual freedom. For example, Kant suggests
that restrictions on commerce are a threat to the
“vitality of business” and should therefore be elimi-
nated by ambitious rulers, who presumably need a
large tax base for their military adventures (8:27).32
This kind of economic reform may be indirectly
related to intellectual freedom, however. Such freedom
is not exercised in a vacuum: it requires access not only
to one’s fellow scholars in a cosmopolitan society of
letters but also to material goods (such as books and
periodicals) and leisure time. To the extent that such
reform increases per-capita income, it will improve
access to these goods and consequently act as an
oblique support for intellectual freedom and enlight-
enment.
Other internal reforms are directly related to intel-
lectual freedom, though, as Kant points out in the fol-
lowing passage from the essay:
Restrictions placed upon personal activities are increas-
ingly relaxed, and general freedom of religion is granted.
And thus, although folly and caprice creep in at times,
enlightenment gradually arises. It is a great benefit which
the human race must reap even from its rulers’ self-
seeking schemes of expansion, if only they realize what
is to their own advantage. But this enlightenment . . .
must gradually spread upwards towards the thrones and
even influence their principles of government. While . . .
the world’s present rulers have no money to spare for
public educational institutions . . . they will nonetheless
find that is to their own advantage at least not to hinder
their citizens’ private efforts in this direction. . . . (8:28;
cf. WIE 8:41–42)
Unfortunately, Kant does not say here why freedom of
religion and freedom of thought more broadly, as well
as tolerance of (if not support for) citizens’ efforts 
to educate themselves, are to the advantage of “self-
seeking” rulers, but once again his reasons are not 
difficult to infer. To begin, religious toleration may
promote social peace, thus freeing up state resources
(especially military ones) for other uses; moreover, it
may secure the loyalty of oppressed but economically
powerful religious minorities.33 More generally,
freedom of thought and the education to make it
effective, by fostering a critical public culture and an
enlightened citizenry, enlists the talents of the people
in the reform process. As noted above, Kant believed
that freedom of the press should be broad, including
matters scientific, religious, and legislative (WIE 8:41).
The critical public culture that results will therefore be
a rich source of new ideas for improving the efficiency
29For more on the concepts of a lex permissiva and of “provisional
right” (provisorisch Recht), see MM 6:223, 247, 256–57, 329. Also
see Ellis (2005), Flikschuh (2000, Chapters 4 and 5), and Shaw
(2005).
30On the role of prudential self-interest in the advance of repub-
licanism, see the exchange between Ludwig (1997) and Brandt
(1997).
31Readers familiar with Kant’s philosophy of history will immedi-
ately recognize the path I am about to take. Given the limitations
of space, I will focus only on those elements of it immediately rel-
evant to the task at hand. For more comprehensive examinations
of his philosophy of history as it is developed in his political and
historical works and in his Critique of Judgment, see Yovel (1980)
and Galston (1975). On the politics of Kant’s philosophy of
history, see Knippenberg (1993, especially 160–66).
32Also see Behrens (1985, 116–51). Behrens notes that “at any given
moment the pursuit of power and the pursuit of prosperity were
likely to be mutually exclusive, since power demanded expendi-
ture for military purposes which accounted for nearly three-quar-
ters of government revenue in every major country and therefore
involved, among other things, a high level of taxation which
reduced the general standard of living. In the long run, however,
these two objectives seemed inextricably linked, since not only did
power depend on wealth; wealth, and indeed mere existence, were
always insecure without power to defend them” (117).
33Cavallar (1993, 115) suggests this may have been Frederick the
Great’s primary reason for tolerating diverse sects. His grandfather
Frederick I’s admission of thousands of persecuted but industri-
ous French Huguenots may have provided a model; see Behrens
(1985, 123–24).
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of public institutions—a desirable state of affairs for
an ambitious, expansionist ruler.
As Rosen has noted, though, these initial rounds
of reform can at best take a society only partway
toward republican governance: economic and intel-
lectual freedom can help create a prosperous and
enlightened populace that is prepared for political
self-rule, but political reforms are needed to realize
such self-rule, and these are difficult to square with the
self-interest of an absolute monarch. Thus Rosen goes
on to claim that monarchical self-interest cannot take
Kant any further and that he therefore falls back on
“the vague hope that ‘education’ will ultimately
provide the solution: only when rulers receive the
right moral education will there be sustained progress
toward . . . a fully just republican state” (1993, 127; cf.
Plato 1991, 153 [473c–d]). One can imagine reasons,
however, why an absolute monarch might set up rep-
resentative institutions, albeit initially weak, advisory
ones. For example, he might create them to learn the
views of his subjects and to provide a venue for the
peaceful expression of grievances. Kant even suggests
a reason why actual powers might be ceded to them:
the need for money. The very geopolitical competition
that forces rulers to implement the initial rounds of
internal reforms may compel them to make political
reforms as a way to extract additional resources from
the people without sparking serious opposition; the
British parliament and other countries’ representative
assemblies gained much of their power as a conse-
quence of monarchical penury (North 1990, 113).
Kant himself offers Louis XVI and his convocation of
the Estates General in 1789 as an example:
A powerful ruler in our time therefore made a very
serious error in judgment when, to extricate himself
from the embarrassment of large state debts, he left it to
the people to take this burden on itself and distribute it
as it saw fit; for then the legislative authority naturally
came into the people’s hands, not only with regard to the
taxation of subjects but also with regard to the govern-
ment, namely to prevent it from incurring new debts 
by extravagance or war. The consequence was that the
monarch’s sovereignty wholly disappeared (it was not
merely suspended) and passed to the people, to whose
legislative will the belongings of every subject became
subjected. (MM 6:341)
Thus, contra Rosen, it can be in the short-run self-
interest of a monarch to empower the people legisla-
tively. Myopia is apparently key here, for as Kant notes,
“a republic, once established, no longer has to let the
reins of government out of its hands and give them
over again to those who previously held them and
could again nullify all new institutions by their
absolute choice” (MM 6:341). The return of sover-
eignty to its original owner (the people) reduces the
monarch to a mere executive, an “organ of the sover-
eign,” who can now be rightfully deposed or otherwise
constrained by a popular legislature, as noted above
(6:319).
By a series of policy innovations, each tactically
sound, an absolute monarchy (or more likely a
dynasty) thus engineers its own downfall and the cre-
ation of a republic. Moreover, this end is (or at least
can be) accomplished without any violations of right,
which would inevitably occur in a revolution (T&P
8:298–304, MM 6:318–23). Whatever one thinks of
the likelihood of such a sequence of events unfolding,
Kant’s theoretical accomplishment here is impressive
and largely unnoticed: he has shown how republican-
ism might emerge from absolute monarchy in a
manner fully consistent with both justice and the
short-run interests of the regent himself—the immac-
ulate conception of a republic, in short, unsullied by
revolutionary violence or monarchical resistance.34
Two Potential Objections
I should now address two likely objections to my
depiction of Kant as an advocate of enlightened abso-
lutism. The first is that this portrayal paints Kant 
as a consequentialist: under my interpretation, Kant
believes that republicanism should be postponed until
after a people has become enlightened because its
premature practice would have a negative conse-
quence (viz. it would be self-defeating). Given that
Kant’s practical philosophy is considered the paradig-
matic example of nonconsequentialism, my interpre-
tation is instantly suspect.35 The problem identified
here is not unique to Kant, however, but faces any
nonconsequentialist theory that has a nonideal com-
ponent: because nonideal theory is about not only
acting under nonideal conditions but also generating
ideal conditions, it seems inescapably consequential-
ist, for attaining ideal conditions is one of the desired
results or consequences of our actions under such a
theory.
34Nozick (1974) similarly tried to show how a minimal state could
emerge by way of an “invisible-hand” process that violates no indi-
vidual rights. His argument was sharply criticized by the anarcho-
capitalist Rothbard (1977).
35Others have accused Kant of consequentialism, including Sidg-
wick, who maintains that Kant’s argument for an imperfect duty
of beneficence (GMM 4:423) relies illegitimately on prudential
considerations. See Sidgwick (1907, 389n) as well as the persua-
sive reply by Herman (1993b, Chapter 3), who offers a nonpru-
dential interpretation of Kant’s argument.
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To be more concrete, consider Rawls’ theory of
justice, which is also nonconsequentialist and has a
nonideal component. Speaking of the basic liberties
that form such an important part of his theory, Rawls
says that “it is only when social circumstances do not
allow the effective establishment of these basic rights
that one can concede their limitation; and even then
these restrictions can be granted only to the extent
that they are necessary to prepare the way for the time
when they are no longer justified” (1999b, 132 and
§39). In other words, restrictions on the basic liberties
that are allowed under nonideal conditions are only
justified insofar as they help to bring about ideal con-
ditions, after which the ideal theory (the special con-
ception of justice) will apply and the restrictions will
be removed. Notice, however, the consequentialist
quality of this claim: an action (restricting basic liber-
ties) is justified only insofar as it leads to good results
(achieving ideal conditions). The tension between a
nonconsequentialist ideal theory and a consequential-
ist nonideal theory is therefore present in Rawls’ work
as well.
This paper is not the place to try to resolve such a
difficult issue, which has preoccupied many eminent
Kantians, but I can at least point the way towards a
resolution for the enlightened absolutism case.36 As
noted above, an absolute monarch ruling an unen-
lightened populace cannot conform to the letter of
republicanism, because under such conditions it
would be self-defeating: an unenlightened people is
incapable of governing itself, and a premature repub-
licanism would dissolve in censorship, outbreaks of
lawlessness, and the replacement of old prejudices
with new ones. As Kant repeatedly emphasizes,
however, a monarch can rule in the spirit of republi-
canism under such conditions by respecting intellec-
tual freedom, the rule of law, and the independence 
of the judiciary, by consulting citizen assemblies,
by refraining from territorial expansion, etc. (PP
8:352–53, 372; MM 6:340). This “aspirational” repub-
licanism can be justified instrumentally, as a means to
popular enlightenment, but need not be: it can also be
justified noninstrumentally as the closest approxima-
tion to the political ideal—a republic of free, equal,
and independent citizens—that is possible under non-
ideal conditions. Such a justification is nonconse-
quentialist because it is the political ideal itself, not the
desirable consequence of approximating it (viz. an
enlightened citizenry), that provides both the imme-
diate motivation and a model for principled political
action. Action that advances enlightenment but vio-
lates the spirit of republicanism (e.g., censoring the
expression of popular prejudices in the media), on the
other hand, cannot be given such a nonconsequen-
tialist justification.
The second, related objection is that my reading
of Kant turns him into a paternalist. In the introduc-
tion, I noted that enlightened absolutism requires 
subjects to remain (temporarily) in a state of political
minority (Unmündigkeit), with the absolute monarch
behaving as a benevolent parent preparing his minor
children for political adulthood. But in “Theory and
Practice,” Kant is adamant that “a paternalistic govern-
ment (imperium paternale), in which the subjects, like
minor children . . . are constrained to behave only
passively . . . is the greatest despotism thinkable”
(8:290–91; cf. MM 6:316–17). How can these 
apparently contrary views about paternalism be 
reconciled?
The answer lies in Kant’s understanding of pater-
nalistic government. Such a government has two
closely connected characteristics. First, it focuses all of
its attention on the happiness of its subjects rather
than on their inchoate capacity for the rightful exer-
cise of freedom; moreover, it maintains them in a state
of dependence as submissive recipients of pleasure,
dispensed at the whim of the ruler. Second, it tries to
impose its own concept of happiness on subjects
rather than advancing theirs: they must “wait . . .
upon the judgment of the head of state as to how they
should be happy” (T&P 8:291). The subjects of pater-
nalistic government are therefore doubly passive by
design: passive both in their enjoyment of happiness
and in their conception of it.
Kant’s vision of enlightened absolutism has
nothing to do with paternalistic government so
understood. In it, an absolute monarch is led (whether
by his own conscience or, more likely, by the cunning
of history) to establish a rightful constitution, i.e., a
republic, in which citizens jointly exercise sovereignty
and each pursues his own happiness “in whatever 
way seems best to him, provided he does not infringe
upon that universal freedom in conformity with 
law and hence upon the right of other fellow subjects”
(T&P 8:298). Republican citizenship is active, not
passive: active in its use of political power and active
in its pursuit of a happiness freely conceived but 
consistent with right. Enlightened absolutism for 
Kant is therefore not a coercive eudaimonism 
but rather a political philosophy of development, one
that rejects mass pacification in favor of the gradual
36These preoccupied Kantians include Herman, Korsgaard, and
Schapiro. In this paragraph I follow the approach of Schapiro
(1999, 2003, 2005).
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realization of popular independence and self-
government.37
Conclusion
I have argued in this paper that Kant in his political
writings traces a path from absolute monarchy to
republican government. This transition begins with
an enlightened ruler at the head of a powerful mili-
tary, one who simultaneously allows open public
debate on matters scientific, religious, and political
but restricts the private use of reason within social
hierarchies for the sake of public order and other
important communal ends. This blend of intellectual
freedom and civil unfreedom makes possible the col-
lective enlightenment of a population, which is then
prepared for both intellectual and political self-gov-
ernment. The ruler who pursues this path is not
merely discharging a moral obligation to his people
but also strengthening his society for economic and
military competition with other nations. This compe-
tition will—if all goes according to nature’s plan—
compel this same ruler gradually to cede sovereign
power to a popular legislature for the sake of his short-
run financial needs. In this way a pure republic
emerges, one characterized by a separation of powers,
a representative democratic legislature, a unitary but
limited executive, and a franchise open to all who can
escape personal dependence.
As we have seen, Kant offers a full theoretical
account of democratic transitions, one that has been
largely ignored by the scholarly community. Contem-
porary political theory, especially its neo-Kantian
forms (e.g., those of Rawls, Gewirth [1978], and
Habermas [1998]), would be greatly enriched by a
reexamination of Kant’s writings on politics and
history. His theory of democratization, despite its
many contentious claims, offers a useful starting point
for reflections on how to make real-world practices
and institutions consistent with right—a mode of the-
orizing made all the more pertinent by recent geopo-
litical upheaval.
Political theorists are not the only scholars who
would benefit from such a reexamination, though, as
there are many points of contact between his nonideal
theory and prominent accounts of democratic transi-
tions in the comparative-politics literature. For
example, Huntington has claimed that the first phase
of political modernization requires the concentration
of political power for purposes of reform, whether 
in the hands of a traditional monarch or a military
regime, and he has also pointed out that “external
threats and conflicts furnished the principal impetus
to innovation and centralization” in absolute monar-
chies (1968, 145–46, 154, 164, 203, 222)—both claims
we have encountered before in Kant. O’Donnell
(2000) has argued that stable democratic self-govern-
ment has resulted from a long process of legal,
economic, and political liberalization under nonde-
mocratic regimes and that the associated development
of individual agency (a moral and intellectual enlight-
enment he associates with autonomy and responsibil-
ity for one’s choices) has helped make such
self-government possible.38 IR scholars who study the
democratic-peace hypothesis frequently make refer-
ence to Kant’s essay “Perpetual Peace”; those compar-
ativists who investigate democratic transitions might
likewise find inspiration in his other contributions to
political theory and the philosophy of history.39
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37Perhaps unsurprisingly, Kant appears to reject “paternalistic gov-
ernment” in parenting as well: parents have a duty to develop and
educate their child, both morally and “pragmatically” (i.e., in
anticipation of his vocation), in order to prepare him to be “a
citizen of the world,” which entails independence from his parents.
Kant makes no mention whatsoever of happiness in this context.
See MM 6:280–82.
38In this paper, O’Donnell uses a model of agency broadly inspired
by Kant and several other Enlightenment thinkers to explore the
preconditions of democratic self-government (37–44). Unfortu-
nately, much of this material was dropped from the published
version of the paper (O’Donnell 2001).
39Michael Doyle is one IR scholar who systematically engages
Kant’s texts—see, for example, Doyle (1983).
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